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ORAL ARGUMENT IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES
Stephen M. Shapiro *
The art of oral argument in the Supreme Court of the United States has
been discussed with great competence by a number of distinguished writ-
ers.' Before approaching the lectern of the Supreme Court, any advocate
would do well to consult these eminent authorities. There is one aspect of
the argument process, however, which has not, in my judgment, received
the emphasis which it deserves. And to this extent, the neophyte may go
astray. While Justice Jackson has likened oral argument to the stately pro-
cess of "building a Cathedral,"2 counsel is apt to conclude, after complet-
ing a first argument, that the experience is more akin to an intense athletic
contest, hedged by rigid time restrictions and potentially fatal fumbles and
missteps. Unlike the builder of a cathedral, the Supreme Court advocate
does not have the luxury of time, and the preconceived architecture of the
argument must, in nearly every instance, be set aside in its entirety. The
intensity of the debate, and the shortness of available time, are all impor-
tant aspects of Supreme Court argument which require the advocate's clos-
est attention.
I. PURPOSES OF ORAL ARGUMENT
Before turning to the specifics of oral argument technique, it is useful for
the attorney, facing his or her first argument in the Supreme Court, to try
* Mr. Shapiro, a partner at Mayer, Brown & Platt specializing in appellate litigation,
formerly served as Deputy Solicitor General of the United States. B.A., 1968, Yale Univer-
sity; J.D., 1971, Yale Law School. The author is indebted to Judge Daniel M. Friedman,
Robert L. Stem, Andrew L. Frey, Kenneth S. Geller, Frank H. Easterbrook, William C.
Bryson, and Daniel Harris for their helpful suggestions on the subject of this article.
1. Among the most valuable of these discussions are: R. STERN, APPELLATE PRACTICE
IN THE UNITED STATES ch. 7 (1981); R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE
ch. 14 (1978); F. WIENER, BRIEFING & ARGUING FEDERAL APPEALS ch. 7 (1967); Pretty-
man, Supreme Court Advocacy." Random Thoughts in a Day of Time Restrictions, 4 LITIGA-
TION 16 (1978); Griswold, Appellate Advocacy, With Particular Reference to the United States
Supreme Court, 26 RECORD OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 342 (1971); Jackson,
Advocacy Before the United States Supreme Court, 37 A.B.A. J. 801 (1951); Davis, The Argu-
ment of an Appeal, 26 A.B.A. J. (1940).
2. Jackson, supra note 1, at 864.
Catholic University Law Review
to envision what it is that the Justices expect to accomplish through oral
argument, and likewise to bear in mind what experienced advocates seek
to accomplish. By viewing the oral argument process from both sides of
the bench, the advocate is better equipped to give an effective presentation
and to anticipate and grapple with questions from the Court.
Most regular observers of the argument sessions of the Supreme Court
would agree, I think, that the Justices utilize the oral argument process to
achieve the following objectives:
a) Clarfication of the record. In nearly every argument, the Justices
attempt to bring into better focus important record facts, including details
of relevant pleadings, findings at the trial or administrative level, holdings
of the lower courts, steps taken to preserve points in the trial court and on
appeal, and the adequacy of the specification of questions presented in the
petition for certiorari or jurisdictional statement.
b) Clarfication of the substance of claims. Despite the best efforts of
the brief writer, it is common for the Justices to insist upon a further expla-
nation concerning the precise nature of the claims presented to the Court.
What exactly is counsel contending in the Supreme Court?
c) Clarfication of the scope of claims. More so than most lower courts,
the Supreme Court is interested in the scope of arguments and principles
relied on by the parties. How far does the principle go that counsel in-
vokes? This, of course, is the domain of the hypothetical question, which
the Justices propound with frequency during oral argument.
d) Examination of the logic of claims. The Justices commonly require
attorneys to explain apparent inconsistencies between oral statements and
positions articulated in the briefs, or discrepancies between findings made
by the lower courts and positions taken in the Supreme Court. Still more
frequently, the Justices require counsel to explain how his or her position
can be reconciled with past relevant decisions of the Supreme Court, or the
plain language, structure, or history of controlling statutes.
e) Examination of thepractical impact of claims. Since the Justices are
responsible for rendering decisions that embody wise policy consistent
with the intent of Congress and the framers of the Constitution, they per-
sistently inquire into the practical impact of the positions advocated by
counsel. Will a particular position impose excessive burdens on law en-
forcement officers, interfere unreasonably with the freedoms of private citi-
zens, or hamper the legitimate activities of honest businessmen?
f) Lobbyingfor or against particular positions. Several of the Justices
use oral argument as an early opportunity to make known their tentative
views to the other Justices, and to express, at least indirectly, their agree-
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ment or disagreement with the submissions of counsel. Thus, to some ex-
tent, the argument serves as an early conference, where the views of both
lawyers and judges can be expressed and debated. The use of the argu-
ment for this purpose-in addition to the clarification of factual and legal
uncertainties-raises difficult tactical problems which are discussed in
greater detail below.
It also is useful to consider the objectives of oral argument from the
point of view of experienced Supreme Court advocates. The following
summary of objectives is based on observations of senior attorneys in the
Office of the Solicitor General.3
a) Motivating the Justices to view the case sympathetically. Every advo-
cate is, in an important sense, a salesperson, and the object of advocacy is
persuasion of other human beings. Oral argument is the lawyer's only op-
portunity to meet the decisionmakers eye to eye, without "screening" from
law clerks, and without distractions from the five thousand other cases that
the Court confronts each year. Oral argument gives the advocate the op-
portunity to personally motivate the Justices to rule in his or her favor by
conveying the impression that fairness, common sense, and the general
public interest strongly support his position.
b) Simplifying information needed to decide the case in counsel's favor.
Oral argument offers the opportunity to separate out the truly important,
pivotal considerations in a case, and to give the Justices the few specific
"implements of decision" which are needed to resolve the case in a correct
manner. Counsel must bear in mind that the Justices cast their votes in
conference only a few days after hearing oral argument in twelve cases,
nearly all of which have extensive records and lengthy briefs. It is essen-
tial, therefore, to give the Justices the few specific points that are needed to
resolve the case correctly, and which remand stick in the Justices' minds
until conference.
c) Laying to rest concerns or diyfculties that the Justices express. In
nearly every oral argument, the Justices express their misgivings, concerns,
and doubts about counsel's submission. Some of them may tell counsel
precisely what their pivotal uncertainty is and invite him to dispel that
uncertainty. This, of course, is an opportunity to lay to rest not only their
concerns, but also those of other Justices who share the same point of view.
Although the observation is hardly original, it is important to reiterate that
oral argument is counsel's only opportunity to effectively "participate in
3. For a description of the Solicitor General's Office, see McCree, The Solicitor General
and His Client, 59 WASH. U.L.Q. 337 (1981).
1984]
Catholic University Law Review
the conference" and come to grips with the real questions that trouble the
Court.
d) Making a positive and memorable personal impression. Cases in the
Supreme Court frequently are close, and the Justices look to counsel for
guidance and leadership. If the Court has confidence in counsel, this will
smooth the way to acceptance of counsel's arguments. By contrast, an at-
torney who makes a poor personal impression necessarily raises obstacles
to acceptance of his or her contentions. The personal impression that one
must convey is that of respectfulness, utmost candor, reliability, complete
knowledge of the record, and sincere conviction. These impressions derive
not only from the substance and style of the argument, but also from subtle
forms of nonverbal communication-including counsel's tone of voice,
"body language," and attire. In arguing policy positions, counsel must en-
deavor to convey the impression that such positions are carefully consid-
ered and reasonably formulated in light of the interests of all affected
persons.
e) Demonstrating that the argument hangs together underfire. Oral ar-
gument is the anvil on which a solid position is hammered out and con-
firmed--or shattered entirely by repeated blows. Effective advocates use
oral argument to dramatically demonstrate that his position is sound.
Thus, despite difficult questions and criticisms, there always is a logical
response and the argument hangs together in a coherent way. There are,
in short, no hidden defects, gaps in reasoning, or unanticipated conse-
quences. Some arguments fall apart entirely under the pressure of argu-
ment. Other arguments, which have been carefully honed in advance, are
strengthened and confirmed by the process of debate.
II. ARGUMENT PREPARATION
Argument preparation is an essential means to meet the goals described
above.' It is a truism that counsel should "know the record from cover to
cover." But the point is of crucial importance. Not only is familiarity with
the record essential to provide specific information to the Justices, but it is
also essential to convey the impression of reliability and leadership that is
fundamental to any effective presentation. The attorney who cannot turn,
in a moment, to an essential part of the record, or who cannot answer
questions about the state of the record, will not command the confidence
of the Justices.
In this connection, however, it is essential to undertake a rough cost/
4. This subject is comprehensively treated in the authorities noted previously in this
article. See supra note 1.
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benefit analysis early in the process of preparing for oral argument. If the
record is truly voluminous-as, for example, the record of a six month
antitrust trial---counsel may simply not have time to personally read each
page of testimony and each exhibit. Any attempt to do so would under-
mine preparation on other central matters. The solution, in this instance,
is to obtain the help of trial counsel and junior assistants, who can identify
essential portions of the record for review and provide concise summaries
of the remainder. In addition, a close reading of the Supreme Court's past
relevant decisions will acquaint one with the record facts that have been
deemed important by the Justices in similar situations. The attorney who
argues the case must master such facts through personal study, despite the
length of the record. Of course, any portions of the record cited in the
briefs or the opinions below imperatively call for counsel's personal
examination.
While counsel is preparing for oral argument, it is advisable to spend a
day or two listening to arguments at the Supreme Court in Washington,
D.C. Even counsel who have argued frequently before the Court get a
better "feel" for courtroom dialectics through these regular visits, and are
more comfortable with the argument when their case is called for presenta-
tion. If the Court is not in session, counsel may wish to listen to tape
recordings of oral arguments at the National Archives in Washington,
D.C. It is also possible to examine transcripts of past Supreme Court argu-
ments, which are available in microfiche form in law libraries throughout
the nation.
All significant case authorities must be read and reread before argu-
ment, while peripheral cases may be reviewed through summaries from
assistants. Counsel also should try to "read around" in the area, including
any relevant law review articles and policy-oriented materials such as eco-
nomics studies. Familiarity with issues of policy will better equip counsel
to deal with the questions likely to be heard from the bench.
Argument preparation also requires the advocate to think through the
theory of his or her case and consider its relationship to other areas of law.
It is not enough to have an internally logical theory of law. Questions
from the bench almost certainly will require counsel to explain the connec-
tion between his or her argument and other related legal subjects. For
example, in a case involving forum shopping challenged under the due
process clause, the Court is likely to inquire: what is the relevance of the
doctrine of forum non conveniens, statutory transfer under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404, and venue restrictions? The issues, in short, should not be consid-
1984]
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ered in isolation. Counsel should use a "macroscope" as well as a "micro-
scope" in examining the legal issues and anticipating questions.
Each brief submitted by counsel to the Supreme Court, and each propo-
sition to be covered during oral argument, must be reviewed from the
point of view of a skeptical or hostile Justice who is intent upon exposing
all latent fallacies and errors. Jot down such questions and think through
the best response. The very process of anticipating questions and devising
effective replies will strengthen one's understanding of the legal issues, and
help to build an intellectual framework that lends substantial assistance in
dealing with even unanticipated questions from the bench. An assistant
with an objective viewpoint also should be recruited for the purpose of
identifying questions.
In trying to anticipate questions from the bench, it should be kept in
mind that many questions will pertain to the familiar, common-sense
themes discussed previously. What is the case about? (What are the rec-
ord facts and procedural history?) What do you want? (What holding do
you want in this case? What rule do you want the Court to adopt to justify
that holding? Is there any other rule that would satisfy you?) How would
your rule work? (What are the practical consequences of the rule? How
would it change current practices? Can it be administered?) Can the
Court do that? (Is there a legally respectable argument for the rule? Does
it have support in relevant authorities? Is it consistent with what the Court
has said before?) Why should we do that? (What values and interests
would be advanced by adoption of the proposed rule? Would opposing
values and interests be fairly accommodated? Why is the rule sought by
counsel preferable to the alternative?) After anticipating questions in these
categories, counsel should develop simple and common-sense replies.
They should be convincing on an intuitive level, even to the layman.
The attorney preparing for argument should discuss the issues in the
case with anyone who will listen. Intelligent laymen may raise questions
that are highly pertinent, as may attorneys who specialize in other fields of
law. Specialists in the field, of course, can provide sophisticated insights
into potential difficulties. If the case arises in a field of interest to nonlaw-
yer specialists-such as economists, sociologists, or businessmen-the is-
sues should be discussed with such persons as well. Brainstorming sessions
with such persons frequently result in the identification of questions and
issues that later arise during the course of oral argument.
Perhaps a week in advance of the scheduled oral argument, it is advis-
able to conduct one or more moot court sessions. Enough time should be
allowed to assimilate the questions and revise the argument outline after
[Vol. 33:529
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the moot court. It also is essential to tape record the oral argument presen-
tation to assure that it can be covered in the allotted time, and to assure
that all of the expressions to be used in court are easily comprehended
through the spoken word. Many expressions that make perfect sense in
written form are highly awkward-if not incomprehensible-when spo-
ken. The tape recorder is effective in revealing what kind of rhetoric "gets
across" through the oral medium.
Since nearly every oral argument is punctuated with intense question-
ing, the argument is not under counsel's complete control. It is essential,
therefore, to plan an argument that expands or contracts depending upon
the amount of questioning from the bench. Needless to say, the three or
four most important points should be identified in advance. And the oral
argument outline should be clearly marked to show which matters are dis-
pensable if questioning becomes intense.
III. THE SUBSTANCE OF ORAL ARGUMENT
Although the text, history, and purpose of the Constitution and federal
legislation are the most important factors in analyzing legal issues, there is
no doubt that the Supreme Court, sitting as a tribunal of last resort, is a
body which declares public policy. To be effective, therefore, counsel must
convince the Court that his or her position is sensible, good for the nation,
and fair and reasonable for all persons affected by the Court's decision.
Most of the cases which reach the Supreme Court are doubtful, and re-
spectable opinions could be written to justify either affirmance or reversal.
In this situation, technical legal reasoning will not suffice. The Supreme
Court is called upon to render wise decisions which serve the welfare of
the entire nation. Its decisions, if erroneous, are extremely difficult to cor-
rect through the process of legislative revision or constitutional amend-
ment. The Court is well aware of this. It accordingly is most receptive to
arguments which demonstrate that counsel's legal theory is beneficial to
the public, administratively feasible, and consistent with the teaching of
past experience.
Overall, the oral argument must address the reason "why" counsel's po-
sition makes good sense-not merely the technical aspects of the case
which are discussed in the briefs. This means that counsel should not de-
pend heavily on case authority. During the course of oral argument, it
ordinarily is inappropriate to refer to more than two or three decisions.
And those should be Supreme Court decisions. The Court is unimpressed
with arguments that depend on decisions of lower federal courts or state
courts.
1984]
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A few observations about the structure of the oral argument also may be
useful. Every good salesman knows that the first few minutes of an oral
presentation are important. In the Supreme Court, this also is the case.
The introduction should orient the Court so that it can easily follow the
subsequent development of the argument.
In a few sentences, counsel should tell the Court how the case reached it,
what kind of case it is, what counsel's submission is, and what subjects he
or she plans to cover in the allotted time. For example, after being recog-
nized by the Chief Justice, the petitioner might begin as follows:
Thank you Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court.
This case is here on the State of Illinois' petition for certiorari to
the Illinois Supreme Court. The State contends that the court
below erred when it required suppression of relevant evidence.
After briefly summarizing the facts, I would like to explain why
the court below misconceived this Court's decisions in the Agui-
lar and Spinelli cases, and then explain why, in any event, the
evidence should be admitted in view of the good faith of the ar-
resting officers.
Respondent, in turn, might begin as follows:
Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. Respondent
submits that the decision below was compelled by the holding
and logic of this Court's decisions in Aguilar and Spineli, and
that the purposes of the fourth amendment require adherence to
those precedents. After describing several essential facts that
have been overlooked by petitioner, I would like to summarize
the important fourth amendment goals that are served by the
suppression order in this case.
Some cases, of course, require more factual development than others.
For example, in Illinois v. Gates,5 the state of Illinois obtained a substantial
tactical advantage by dwelling on the facts of record, which, Justice Rehn-
quist has stated, "reeked of probable cause."6 Even in such a case, how-
ever, the facts must be distilled and simplified. The spoken word will not
bear the burden of many detailed facts. While the eye can take in such
detail, the ear cannot. In most instances, therefore, it is advisable to limit
the preliminary statement of the facts to five minutes or less. The Justices,
of course, have a clear view of the facts from the briefs and opinions be-
low, and are free to ask questions pertaining to the facts as the argument
progresses. Moreover, during the course of arguing the substantive issues,
5. 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
6. Address by Hon. William H. Rehnquist on Oral Argument in the Supreme Court
(Oct. 18, 1983).
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counsel can weave in the facts as they become relevant. The danger inher-
ent in an extended preliminary discussion of the facts is that counsel is
very likely to become bogged down on peripheral questions relating to the
record, only to find that most of his or her argument time has elapsed
before the affirmative points needed to win the case have been introduced.
In structuring the argument, the advocate should attempt to "go for the
jugular" by leading off with the most persuasive point. Critical points
should not, of course, be lost in the shuffle by reserving them for the end.
To the extent possible, however, counsel should attempt to end the argu-
ment on a high note, just as he or she has opened it on a high note. Trial
lawyers know that opening and closing remarks are the most memorable
part of any courtroom communication, and this holds true of oral argu-
ment in the Supreme Court. The argument will stick in the Justices mem-
ory if it both begins and ends on a strong point.
The first point ordinarily will be the point which has to be gotten across
to win the case. Counsel must grab the bull by the horns and give his most
convincing argument on this critical issue. It is a mistake to lead off the
analysis with an argument of lesser persuasiveness, or an argument that is
unnecessarily provocative or dubious. Such an argument will generate
friction with the Justices and cast a pall of skepticism over the entire
presentation.
In preparing the oral argument, counsel should bear in mind the terms
of Supreme Court Rule 38, which states that "oral argument should under-
take to emphasize and clarify the written argument appearing in the briefs
. . . ,' This means that the argument should give "flesh and blood" to
the detailed legal arguments contained in the brief. It does not mean that
the brief should be merely summarized or paraphrased. Indeed, Rule 38
advises counsel "that all Members of the Court have read the briefs in
advance of argument."' The rule thus directs counsel to go to the heart of
the case in common sense terms, rather than repeating the technical points
set forth in the briefs on the merits.
The points made during oral argument should be positive, not merely
negative retorts to points made by one's opponent or by the court below.
Counsel must, therefore, give the Court a better alternative than his or her
opponent has offered. The alternative must be a fair solution to a real
world problem, not just a technical legal argument. The solution proposed
must reasonably accommodate competing interests, must be practical from
an administrative point of view, and must have desirable practical conse-
7. SuP. CT. R. 38 (1982).
8. Id.
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quences. As Deputy Solicitor Geller has observed, an effective argument
convinces the Court that "the world will be a better place" if counsel's
submissions are accepted. 9
The argument advanced by one's opponent also may be dealt with
briefly, but the refutation should be straightforward and easy to compre-
hend. Frequently, a discussion of the adverse practical effects of the oppo-
nent's argument is sufficient to demonstrate its weakness. For example:
"If petitioner's expansive jurisdictional theory were accepted, that would
mean that companies which sell their products on a nation-wide basis
could be sued in any State, regardless of the residence of the parties and
the witnesses and regardless of the place of the tort. A New York case
could be dragged into the courts of Hawaii or Alaska for no better reason
than the plaintiff's desire to avoid the statute of limitations in New York.
This would invite forum shopping on the grandest scale."
A few hints about some of the narrower points of oral argument also
may be helpful. Counsel should not read at length from statutes, cases, or
legislative history. This is a terrible bore and a waste of time. At the same
time, however, one must come to grips with, and briefly quote, the plain
language of any statute or constitutional provision that is controlling. As
the Supreme Court stated in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,' the starting
point in every case of statutory construction is the text of the statute itself.
Indeed, in cases involving questions of statutory construction, the Court is
highly skeptical of policy arguments that are not firmly rooted in the con-
trolling statutory language."
The question sometimes arises whether counsel may go beyond the rec-
ord during oral argument. In making an affirmative contention, one
should adhere closely to the record. In response to a specific question,
however, counsel may transcend the bounds of the record. He or she
should first inform the Court that the answer to the question is beyond the
record, then provide the answer, and finally state the source of his or her
information. In particular, the Court expects lawyers for governmental
units to be able to provide information about the government's own
operations.
The style of the argument must, in all respects, be simple and hard hit-
ting. Nothing detailed, subtle, or rhetorical ever gets across during oral
argument. For example, lengthy citations of statistics are nearly indigest-
9. Remarks by Kenneth S. Geller, Conference on Supreme Court Advocacy (Oct. 18,
1983).
10. 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976).
11. See, e.g., TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 172-73, 194-95 (1978).
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ible, as are chapter and verse citations to cases. Long sentences and windy
paragraphs are nearly impossible to comprehend. As previously noted,
one must at all times bear in mind the inherent limitations of the spoken
word.
Finally, the advocate should remember that the greatest barrier to an
effective argument is boredom. It is imperative that the argument be vivid
and striking. This does not result, of course, from exaggeration or from
irrelevant emotional appeals. Counsel should never attempt to harangue
the Justices or to speak in the florid and emotional style cultivated by some
trial attorneys. Counsel's speech should, however, be varied, with changes
in inflection, volume, and pace. An occasional appropriate metaphor also
may be relied upon to facilitate communication. The style of the presenta-
tion should fall approximately half way between a formal speech and a
personal conversation. It must be clear, forceful, and emphatic, without
any element of stilted oratory or artificial rhetoric.
IV. THE MECHANICS OF DELIVERING ORAL ARGUMENT
The technique for delivering an oral argument varies from attorney to
attorney. There is no single technique which all experienced attorneys fol-
low. A few general observations, however, are applicable even in this area.
Initially, as the Supreme Court's rules admonish in italicized words: "The
Court looks with disfavor on any oral argument that is readfrom a prepared
text. ' 2 Reading from a prepared text is sure to put any audience to sleep,
and the favorable personal impression required of the successful advocate
cannot be achieved without continuous eye contact.
This does not mean, however, that counsel should approach the lectern
with no oral argument notes or outline. Although a few advocates are able
to present effective arguments without reliance on notes, most find that an
outline or list of points is essential to assure continuity in the argument, to
permit quick returns to important subjects after sharp debates with the
Court, and to avoid delays while counsel gropes for the next point to be
covered.
Many attorneys bring with them to the lectern a one or two page outline
of key points and phrases or quotations. Robert L. Stern observes that he
frequently writes out his arguments in advance in order to think through
each point clearly, and then distills the written text to an outline contain-
ing key headings, words and phrases.13 A glance at the outline permits
him to recall the substance of the points he wishes to convey.
12. See Sup. CT. R. 38, supra note 7.
13. R. STERN, supra note 1, at 390-91.
1984]
Catholic University Law Review
Other attorneys bring with them a text, which they do not read, but
which they use to refresh their recollection by glancing at the familiar
points set forth in the text. Still others use note cards, arranged in proper
sequence, to remind them of points and authorities. If counsel has not yet
decided which of these techniques is most effective, it is advisable to exper-
iment with different techniques during moot court sessions prior to the ar-
gument in the Supreme Court.
No matter what form the outline, notes, or text ultimately may take,
counsel should indicate in dark ink the portions of the argument that are
most important and the portions that are expendable in the event of in-
tense questioning. Likewise, when facts, quotations, or cases are to be dis-
cussed during oral argument, the correct page references should be noted
in the margin for citation to the Court if it requests such information. De-
tailed record citations also may be placed on note cards for ready reference
in the event that the Court seeks specific citations.
When approaching the lectern,' 4 counsel should be equipped with all of
the basic materials needed for responses to detailed questioning. Next to
him at counsel table or lodged in the hands of an assistant, he should have
copies of all petitions, briefs, and appendices filed in his case in the
Supreme Court. Likewise, he should be armed with copies of any record
materials that are relevant to the argument, copies of any portions of legis-
lative history that could be pertinent, and copies of the most significant
cases. It is not advisable, however, to carry to the lectern the entire record,
although an assistant may have the most important portions ready at hand.
All such materials should be tabbed so that counsel can get to relevant
portions in a moment. The object, of course, is to have close at hand any-
thing that might be quoted to the Justices, or anything that might be
needed to answer a question or to respond to the argument of the
opponent. 5
As the argument commences, counsel should jot down the time that ap-
pears on the large clock behind the bench in the courtroom. This permits a
quick determination at any point during the argument of how much time
14. The height of the lectern is adjustable to accommodate both the near-sighted and
far-sighted practitioner. The necessary adjustment should be made before counsel begins
the oral argument.
15. Occasionally, a new statute or regulation may come to counsel's attention shortly
before the argument. The Supreme Court's rules permit the filing of a supplemental memo-
randum addressed to such matters. However, if the matter is important and must be re-
ferred to during argument, the attorney may lodge ten copies of the statute or regulation
with the Clerk with a request that each Justice receive a copy, and should simultaneously
make service upon opposing counsel. New matters of significance should not be raised for
the first time during oral argument.
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has elapsed and allows counsel to decide "on the fly" how much of the
argument outline can be covered and how much must be abandoned.
Obtaining assistance from an associate at counsel table is permissible,
but, if repeated, can create the negative impression that one is poorly pre-
pared. If the Court asks an important question that counsel cannot an-
swer, he may turn briefly to an assistant for the requested information.' 6 It
is important to settle in advance what to do about the passing of notes
from assistants. Ordinarily, a stream of notes containing bright ideas is an
enormous distraction, and should be forbidden. It is not possible to pay
attention to the questions asked by the Justices and the arguments of the
opponent while attempting to decipher handwritten notes of an assistant.
Note passing should be permitted only in a real emergency, or when the
oral advocate requests written assistance.
Much advice has been given about effective public speaking in the
Supreme Court. The nub of it is straightforward: the advocate should
speak clearly, stand straight at the lectern, and deliver an argument with a
controlled cadence. Long pauses while groping for the next point, or while
flipping through the record for a page reference, must be avoided. The
correct balance of volume is a matter that requires experimentation and
the advice of moot court observers. Counsel should not bellow at the Jus-
tices.' 7 Neither should he or she mutter or mumble during oral argument.
The impression to be conveyed through volume, tone, and gesture is that
of confidence, sincerity, and respect before the Court. This precludes ex-
aggerated gestures, pointing at the Justices, wandering from the lectern,
and other forms of distracting behavior.
Courtesy toward the Court is, of course, an all important element. Jus-
tices should be referred to as "Mr. Chief Justice," "Justice ," or
"your Honor." Justices never should be referred to as "Judge"; still more
clearly, no present or past Justice ever should be referred to by last name
only, without the preceding title "Justice ." In speaking to the Jus-
tices, counsel always should display the kind of courtesy and respect used
in communicating with a senior partner or superior in the government.
This means that even if, in the heat of argument, the Court is not "unfail-
ingly courteous" toward counsel, counsel must be "unfailingly courteous"
toward the Court.
This does not imply that counsel should be timorous or overawed. It is
16. In rare cases, the Chief Justice may grant leave to file a concise supplemental mem-
orandum addressed to the point in question.
17. The close proximity of the bench to the lectern, and the sensitive voice amplification
equipment used in the courtroom, make loud declamation unbearable to the Justices and to
observers in the courtroom.
19841
Catholic University Law Review
never appropriate to "buckle under" just because an individual Justice
seems displeased with one's position. Colonel Wiener correctly character-
ized the proper frame of mind, and the proper form of address, as that of
"respectful intellectual equality."18
V. QUESTIONS FROM THE BENCH
Questions from the bench come in all forms and varieties. They range
from the difficult to the obvious, from the subtle to the whimsical. The
variety, rapidity, and unpredictability of questioning from the bench is
perhaps the distinguishing hallmark of oral argument before the nine Jus-
tices of the Supreme Court. Counsel should not be unnerved or surprised
by this outpouring of questions. They call, however, for a snap judgment
concerning the scope and nature of the response. Speaking quite gener-
ally, questions from the bench fall into the following categories, and call
for the indicated types of replies:' 9
a) Questions that go to the heart of the case. As previously noted, some
Justices ask questions which go to the central issue in the case. The answer
to such a question may well determine the vote of the Justice asking the
question and also may affect the judgment of other Justices who share the
same point of view. Obviously, counsel should spend the most time with
this category of questions. These critical questions also can be used as a
springboard for development of related substantive points that counsel in-
tends to cover during the argument.
b) Background questions. Many questions during argument simply re-
quire a clarification of some record fact. Other questions manifest curios-
ity about matters such as relevant geography, the identity of the judges
below, or the votes cast by the judges below. Counsel should give a quick
and accurate answer to such questions and move on without delay.
c) Fencing or debating questions. The Justices sometimes engage in ex-
tended debates with counsel, which may or may not relate to central mat-
ters in the case. Of course, counsel cannot cut off such debates, despite his
belief that the matter is tangential. Nonetheless, one must avoid getting
bogged down too long on a peripheral point. It is essential in this instance
to give the best possible answer, and find a tactful way to get back to the
main points.
18. F. WIENER, supra note 1, at 299.
19. The range of questions asked by the Court is ably discussed in Prettyman, Supreme
Court Advocacy.- Random Thoughts in a Day of Time Restrictions, 4 LITIGATION 16 (Winter
1978). For a brief description of the questioning style of each Justice, see Mann, Preppingfor
the Justices, 4 AMER. L. 97 (Nov. 1982).
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d) Humorous questions or observations. Counsel should enjoy the re-
mark and then get back to business. While it is not uncommon for the
Court to offer a humorous observation or question, attorneys ordinarily
should refrain from introducing humorous observations of their own. As
often as not, attempts at humor fall flat, and in all instances are a waste of
counsel's limited argument time.
e) Irrelevant questions. It is not uncommon for counsel to hear ques-
tions which he believes are related only remotely to the dispositive issues
in the case. In fact, however, the matter of relevance is personal and rela-
tive, and one should never display irritation over questions that appears to
be beside the point. Counsel should give a polite answer and avoid any
withering glance or trace of sarcasm. He should give a brief response and
then explain why the present case raises a "somewhat different issue."
f) Hostile questions. Counsel should assume from the very beginning
that some of the Justices will present hostile or unfriendly questions, mani-
festing their disagreement with his position. This is no occasion to be un-
nerved or disappointed. Hostility frequently is a sign of frustration that
the questioner is in the minority. Counsel should remember that, while
one or more Justices may seem dissatisfied with his positions or answers, a
majority of the Court may well be on his side. In dealing with hostile
questions, counsel should give a polite but firm response and get back to
his main contentions.
The cardinal rule in dealing with all questions from the bench is to give
a direct, nonevasive response. Inexperienced attorneys frequently antago-
nize the Court by evading questions-responding, for example, by saying
"that presents a different case," or "that really isn't what this case is
about." The Court is well aware that its questions call for analysis of a
point different from the point counsel is pressing. It nonetheless expects a
direct answer.
All answers must be concise and clear. Ordinarily, counsel will find it
impossible to include more than one or two short sentences in a response.
The Justices will interpose a different question if counsel drones on too
long. It is inappropriate, however, to be so anxious to get back to a
planned speech that questions receive a "back-of-the-hand" answer. If the
Court has raised an important point, and is willing to hear an extended
response, counsel should not hesitate to provide it.
Another potent source of annoyance is any attempt by counsel to post-
pone an answer to a question from the bench. One cannot say "I have not
yet come to that point in my argument." The answer from the bench is
likely to be: "You certainly have, and it is time to answer." In some in-
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stances, it is advisable to interrupt the course of the oral argument in order
to give a full-blown response to the Justice who has raised the question.
This is particularly true if the point is an important one. In other in-
stances, it is possible to give a more concise answer on the point, and then
assure the Court that the answer will be elaborated after laying the neces-
sary foundation. If you promise to return to a question, be very sure that
you actually do so.
It is critically important to listen carefully to each question presented
from the bench. The object is not to blurt out a response to the question
before it is finished, in the manner of a high school quiz show. Counsel
should make sure that he or she understands exactly what the Court is
asking. If a question is unclear, the Justice will rephrase it. The Court is
justifiably annoyed by attorneys who waste argument time by responding
to questions which the Court has not asked.
One should not expect, of course, to have an uninterrupted interlude for
presentation of arguments, or even for giving extended answers to ques-
tions. It is not uncommon for the Justices to begin propounding questions
shortly after counsel says "Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court."
This calls for flexibility. Counsel cannot be so wedded to a prepared out-
line that he or she is unable to hop quickly from question to question and
to get back to affirmative points promptly after dealing with questions.
The intensity of the questioning varies considerably from case to case.
Sometimes, counsel's position is so strong or so weak that questioning is
largely superfluous. In other instances, however, the argument is "hot."
That means that counsel gets nothing but questions for a thirty-minute
period.2" Frequently, the questioning process will be dominated by those
Justices who disagree with the position being presented. It is essential in
this situation not to let the argument break down into a series of unrelated
responses. The argument should not become a cross-examination in which
counsel is forced to give a string of unfavorable concessions before the red
light goes on. He must attempt to retain control over the argument in at
least this sense: after answering the question presented by the Justice,
counsel should weave in the affirmative points that are necessary to win
the case. In other words, the advocate must have clearly in mind the main
points that must be presented no matter how intense the questioning be-
comes. And, with a little dexterity, the questions from the Court can be
20. Justice White recently observed that oral argument is an occasion for the Justices
"to clarify their own thinking and perhaps that of their colleagues. Consequently, we treat
lawyers as a resource rather than as orators who should be heard out according to their own
desires." White, The Work of the Supreme Court- .4 Nuts and Bolts Description, 54 N.Y. ST.
B.J. 346, 383 (1982).
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used as stepping stones to make these essential points. For example: "The
answer to your Honor's question is - . And in this connection, I
would emphasize . ... "
Occasionally, counsel will face a "cold" argument in which the Justices
ask very few questions. This possibility requires one to have a prepared
presentation which will extend for twenty to twenty-five minutes, which is
interesting, and which is known well enough to be presented without sup-
porting dialogue. This is not to say that all available time must be used. If
the essential points can be communicated in less time, the Justices will
greatly appreciate counsel's brevity. Beyond this, there is a substantial tac-
tical advantage in conveying the impression that the case is so simple and
straightforward that there is no need to dwell at length upon it. At the end
of such a "cold" argument, counsel may simply say: "Unless the Court has
further questions, I will reserve the balance of my time for rebuttal."
Occasionally, the bench may appear to be so cold that it is virtually
ignoring counsel's argument. Some Justices may talk among themselves
during argument, read materials before them, and even briefly leave the
courtroom during the course of the argument. Counsel should not be un-
nerved by this. Frequently, the Justices are conferring about some aspect
of the case before them. It is usually best simply to forge ahead and try to
make the oral presentation lively and interesting. A short pause for em-
phasis also may bring attention back to the lectern.
Not all questions, of course, are hostile or unfriendly. If an attorney is
having a hard time, a sympathetic Justice may intervene with a friendly
question, or a restatement of the attorney's position, which is intended to
place his case in a favorable light. Ordinarily, such helpful reformulations
should be acknowledged and accepted: "Justice , you have accu-
rately summarized our central contention. . . ." On occasion, however, a
Justice may ask a question that is not quite accurate in its friendly implica-
tion. The best response is to accept the help but politely point out the
mistake. For example: "I would agree with your Honor's approach, but I
think the main support in this situation comes from. . . ." It is not advis-
able merely to accept the help if it rests on a mistaken premise; the other
Justices promptly will identify the fallacy and embarrass counsel for fail-
ing to do so.
Hopefully, counsel will be so well prepared for argument that he or she
will be able to respond to all questions presented from the bench. How-
ever, one also must consider the possibility that a question will be raised to
which the answer is unknown. If the Court asks a question concerning the
record which counsel cannot answer, it is permissible to turn briefly to an
1984]
Catholic University Law Review
assistant for the information. If the point is really an important one, coun-
sel can offer promptly to file a short supplemental memorandum. If this is
not appropriate because the matter is a minor one, it is permissible simply
to say: "I regret that I cannot supply that information. My recollection is,
however, that the subject is discussed in the testimony of
It is not possible to dodge questions calling for a legal judgment. Legal,
hypothetical, or policy questions must be answered on the spot to the best
of one's ability. It is permissible to say "I have not considered that variant
of our situation," but counsel then should proceed to indicate what factors
are pertinent and give his best analysis of the proper outcome.
One need not worry about encountering the conventional law school
question-"give me the facts in the Drybones case." This never arises.
Counsel should, however, know enough about all of the cases cited in his
brief to be able to deal with questions about them and their relevance.
Indeed, some attorneys have been surprised by highly specific questions
from the Court, such as: "You rely on the Johnson case, but didn't the
Court explicitly say in footnote 19 that it was not reaching your issue?"
The possibility of this kind of question requires not only great care in
drafting the brief, but also a clear recollection of significant cited cases.
There should be no need to add that counsel never should bluff about
cases he has not read. If counsel receives a point-blank question about a
case that he does not know, he should admit it and state: "If your Honor
would refresh me concerning the holding in that case, I will try to answer
the question directly." This should not occur, of course, if the case is a
relevant one. Thorough argument preparation will encompass all such
cases.
The Justices frequently ask attorney's to make concessions during the
course of oral argument. It is essential to use utmost care in responding to
such questions, since concessions made in open court can be used against
counsel in deciding the case on the merits.2 ' On the other hand, one can-
not run away from concessions that must be made. This is particularly
true of factual matters. For example, if a Justice inquires "isn't it true that
your client testified ," an answer must be given in the affirmative if
that is the case. In dealing with a question calling for a concession, it is
21. On rare occasions, counsel may realize, after completion of the argument, that he or
she has made an improvident concession on a point of major significance. In such an in-
stance, it may be appropriate to send a concise letter to the Justices through the Clerk, with
10 extra copies, which refers to the question and clarifies the response in a suitable manner.
Service upon opposing counsel also should be made. Needless to say, there is no assurance
that the Justices will honor this kind of retraction. See generally Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S.
545, 573-74 (1979); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 170 (1972).
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essential tofirst answer the question, and only then to explain why the con-
ceded matter is not dispositive. If a Justice is disturbed that you are not
making a concession that you must make, simply say "I do acknowledge
your Honor's point. The record shows . That, however, is not dis-
positive here because . .. ."
Even greater care must be exercised in dealing with questions calling for
a concession of law. For example, it is common for the Justices to ask
questions such as: "Wouldn't you agree that your position should be re-
jected if the facts were ." If you are willing to stand on the distinc-
tion between your case and the variation described by the Justice, you
should simply answer "yes." On the other hand, if it is not crystal clear
that the distinction is a dispositive one, or if your case is not greatly differ-
ent from the hypothetical case, it is best not to concede the point at all. It
is permissible to respond: "I wouldn't concede that the variation would
produce a different result. Your Honor has, of course, described a far less
favorable case for applying the principle we rely on, but it still would con-
trol because . .. ."
Since the Justices must anticipate the future consequences of their deci-
sions in a wide variety of cases arising throughout the nation, they are
highly concerned with the breadth of legal principles they announce and
their potential application to other situations. Counsel therefore must be
ready for the question: "How far do you carry that principle? Would you,
for example, apply it in the following instance. . . ?" Hypothetical ques-
tions such as this are a central feature of oral argument in the Supreme
Court, and they require substantial preparation and analysis in advance.
Counsel should bear in mind that every principle has a breaking point.
Stated otherwise, every principle meets a contrary principle at some point.
Counsel, therefore, must be wary of presenting arguments that sound radi-
cal because principles are extended too far. In distinguishing a hypotheti-
cal situation, it also is essential to remember that it is not sufficient merely
to say "that is a different case." The Justices know that. They want to
know what principle separates the two instances.
During the heat of debate on an important issue, counsel may find that
one or more Justices are especially persistent in questioning and appear
unwilling to relent. This may be the case when a Justice is making known
his or her views in an emphatic manner, and is determined to expose the
weaknesses in counsel's arguments. Often, another Justice will divert this
colloquy by posing a different question that permits counsel to shift back
to a more fruitful line of argument. In the absence of such relief, however,
counsel must give his best answer firmly and politely; he then should at-
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tempt to steer the argument back on course by weaving in affirmative
points. If the hostile Justice returns to the same point, counsel may wish to
say: "Justice , I regret that I cannot improve on the answer I previ-
ously gave the Court on that point." Counsel never should express exas-
peration with the Court for persistent examination. And if it is necessary
to disagree at the end of a colloquy, counsel should do so courteously:
"With great deference, your Honor, we see that case in a very different
light. In our view .... "
Counsel may generate goodwill not only by answering questions in a
forthright and accurate manner, but also by returning briefly to important
questions asked of his opponent who has provided wrong or inadequate
information. For example: "Justice - asked Mr. - whether -
He answered . In fact, however, the Joint Appendix, at page
, discloses a quite different answer on this important question."
VI. RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT, REBUTTAL, AND AMIcus CURIAE
ARGUMENT
The general rules described above apply to the arguments of both peti-
tioner and respondent. However, the respondent is required to exercise
even more flexibility than petitioner. The same is true, of course, of the
appellee, who addresses the court after the appellant has concluded his
argument. Counsel for respondent should approach the lectern with the
same materials-including argument outline, briefs, and appendices. He
also should have in mind the main points that he wishes to make. Counsel
should not use his argument time simply to complain about mistakes that
his opponent has made; he must make his own affirmative case. In short, it
is essential for lawyers on both the "topside" and "bottomside" to give the
Justices the intellectual and emotional basis for ruling in favor of their
clients.
Counsel for respondent should not, however, proceed with the argument
as if he or she was not seated in the courtroom during the preceding half
hour. It is essential to refocus the planned presentation to make it relate to
what has happened during the topside debate. If one is well prepared,
there should not be many surprises. It is a good practice to bring along a
magic marker to annotate the argument outline as counsel for petitioner
speaks, noting the major points that will be added in light of what peti-
tioner's counsel and the Court have said.
If an important exchange between the Court and counsel for petitioner
has taken place, and if it goes to the heart of the case, counsel for respon-
dent may wish to begin with the substance of that colloquy and weave his
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whole argument into the issues that thus have been raised. After making
an affirmative point, it frequently is helpful to turn to related questions
previously asked by the Court of petitioner's counsel and provide cor-
rected responses. In this way, counsel for respondent can make the affir-
mative points that are essential to victory and also disarm the advocacy of
his opponent.
The guiding rules for rebuttal are straightforward. Counsel for peti-
tioner should, of course, attempt to reserve enough time during the topside
argument to permit an adequate rebuttal. Ordinarily, no more than four
or five minutes will be required. But counsel should make every effort to
reserve at least some time for rebuttal. The existence of rebuttal time has a
salutary restraining effect on respondent's counsel, who realizes that any
overstatement or unsupported contention will be exposed at the end of the
argument.
The amount of time reserved for rebuttal is not entirely under counsel's
control. If the Court propounds many questions at the end of the argu-
ment, rebuttal time may vanish. If this appears to be occurring, counsel
politely may remind the Court that he wishes to reserve a moment or two
for rebuttal. Ordinarily, the Court will honor this request, or, in the alter-
native, give petitioner's counsel a minute of rebuttal even if the red light
has flashed on at the end of his argument.
The rebuttal should be planned during the course of respondent's argu-
ment; it never should be prepared in advance. No matter how much time
is left over for rebuttal, counsel should make only three or four important
points. It is not appropriate to compile a long list of your opponent's er-
rors and then touch upon every one of them during rebuttal.
Rebuttal can be quite effective if respondent's counsel has made a state-
ment that is directly contradicted by the record or by some controlling
authority. In either event, counsel on rebuttal should be prepared to give
the Court the dispositive citation. When the red light goes on, counsel
should thank the Court and sit down. However, one may finish answering
a question from the Court, and may answer any new question presented by
the Court, after the red light has flashed on.
Counsel should be forewarned that the Court is visibly impatient with
rebuttal. This means that any rebuttal must be snappy and good. Indeed,
it can be quite effective, after an opponent has made an unimpressive argu-
ment, simply to stand up and say with confidence: "Unless the Court has
questions, we will waive rebuttal."
With the exception of the Solicitor General and his staff, few attorneys
have occasion to present oral argument as amicus curiae. Occasionally,
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representatives of state governmental bodies, or other substantial organiza-
tions, will be permitted, on motion, to present oral argument as amicus
curiae. This, however, is the rare exception.
An attorney appearing as amicus curiae ordinarily will have only ten or
fifteen minutes, as prescribed in the Court's order permitting amicus par-
ticipation. This rigid time restriction calls for special condensation and
dexterity. There is no occasion to spend any time on the facts. Counsel
should give a quick introduction summarizing his position and the ground
to be covered during the allotted time. Then he should embark immedi-
ately upon the two or three main points that must be addressed. One must
be skillful at weaving main points into answers to questions, and steering
the argument back into meaningful channels, when only ten or fifteen min-
utes are available. If, of course, the Court keeps counsel on his or her feet
after expiration of the allotted time with additional questions, he or she
should not hesitate to remain at the lectern. However, if the red light
flashes on and there are no additional questions, counsel should thank the
Court and promptly sit down. Unlike some courts of appeals, the Supreme
Court does not permit any attorney to "wind up" his argument after the
red light has flashed on.
VII. COMMON MISTAKES
It is often observed that, although it is difficult to win a case through oral
argument, it is easy to lose the case during argument. Although, person-
ally, I am more optimistic about the positive potential of the argument
process, I have not the slightest doubt that mistakes during oral argument
have the potential seriously to undermine counsel's position on the mer-
its.2 2 The potential pitfalls and missteps during argument are so numerous
that no catalogue could suffice. However, some mistakes occur with such
frequency that it is appropriate to set them forth as examples.
The following errors have the potential to affect adversely counsel's af-
firmative presentation:
- Leading off the argument with a dubious or unnecessarily provoca-
tive contention that generates friction at the outset.
22. Justice Rehnquist recently has observed:
Oral advocacy is probably more important in the Supreme Court of the United
States than in most other appellate courts. . . . [T]he time set for oral argument is
the only opportunity that you will have to confront face to face the nine Members
of the Court who will ponder and decide your case. The opportunity to convince
them of the merits of your position is at its high point.
W. Rehnquist, Oral Advocacy: A Disappearing Art, 32-33, Brainerd Currie Lecture, Mercer
University School of Law (Oct. 20, 1983).
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- Sticking inflexibly to a prepared speech when the Justices express
interest in other areas.
- Using hyperbole, overstatement, or exaggeration in describing rec-
ord facts.
- Using emotional rhetoric, high-flown oratory, or irrelevant lines of
argument intended to excite emotional responses.
- Bellowing at the Justices in a stentorian tone of voice, or, conversely,
mumbling and muttering.
- Inflicting long and boring delays while groping for page references,
cases, or notes.
- Wandering around the lectern, slouching over the lectern, rocking
back and forth before the lectern, using awkward gesticulations, pointing
at the Justices, jiggling keys or delaying proceedings while drinking water
at the podium.
- Using dry, monotonous speech, without any variation in pitch, pace,
or volume.
- Displaying lack of respect toward the bench, including flippancy or
over-familiarity.
- Relying on lower court authorities, dissenting opinions, or law re-
view articles.
- Failing to come to grips with the plain language of statutory or con-
stitutional provisions.
- Reading from the text of an oral argument script, or reading at
length from legislative history, opinions, statutes, regulations, or the trial
record.
- Rearguing factual points which have been resolved adversely by
both courts below.
- Arguing about the correctness of the lower court's disposition of an
issue of state law.23
- Referring to matters outside the record (such as newspaper articles)
in presenting affirmative arguments.
- Using distracting physical exhibits.24
23. In almost every instance, the Supreme Court will treat a state court's construction of
state law as final. In most instances, the Court likewise will defer to the construction placed
on local law by the lower federal courts, who presumably are more familiar with local law.
24. This almost always is a bad idea. Substantial amounts of time are wasted while
physical evidence is examined, passed around, or stared at in the courtroom. All too fre-
quently, the use of exhibits is perceived as a stunt. If some document must be specially
examined-such as a newly promulgated statute or regulation--counsel should notify the
Clerk well in advance and ask him to distribute copies to all of the Justices prior to argu-
ment. If counsel insists on using a large chart or some similar form of physical evidence
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- Mischaracterizing the Court's institutional role. For example, argu-
ing in a constitutional case that "this Court requires . .. " as opposed to
arguing that "the Constitution, as construed by this Court, requires. . ....
- Arguing to a particular Justice that "your Honor has held in the
Jones case that . . . ." It is the Court that has so held, in an opinion
written by a particular Justice.
- Continuing to talk after the red light has flashed on without any invi-
tation for further argument in the form of additional questions.
Perhaps the most harmful errors of all are made by counsel while re-
sponding to questions. Some of these mistakes are matters of substance;
others are matters of style. All of them have the potential to throw a bath
of cold water on counsel's presentation. These common mistakes include:
- Failing to listen carefully to a question from the bench, and answer-
ing some other question that the Justice has not asked.
- Evading questions by stating "that's a different case. .. " or by fail-
ing to give a direct, simple, and comprehensible answer.
- Refusing to give a "yes" or "no" answer when the Justice so requests
and when it is possible to do so.
- Attempting to postpone answers to questions, or promising to cover
matters that are never covered adequately later.
- Giving long-winded, multiple-paragraph answers to straightforward
questions, or relying on complex and incomprehensible factual descrip-
tions in responding to questions.
- Failing to accept or acknowledge helpful observations or reformula-
tions of argument suggested by a Justice.
- Bluffing about knowledge of a case, statute, or trial transcript.
- Indulging in repeated conferences with lawyers at counsel table prior
to answering questions.
- Giving fearful or timorous responses to overbearing questions, or
displaying disappointment when questioning is hostile.
- Attempting to answer questions by propounding other questions
back to the Court.
- Attempting to respond to a Justice by name, but using the wrong
name.
- Referring to a Justice as "judge" or referring to present or past Jus-
tices only by last names and without the proper title. It is essential to say
during the argument, he should notify the Clerk at least two weeks in advance and obtain
the Court's permission.
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"Mr. Chief Justice," "Justice ," or "Your Honor." Bear in mind
that Justice O'Connor does not wish to be called "Madam Justice."
One final suggestion may be in order. Attorneys arguing for the first
time in the Supreme Court should not worry about nervousness. Even
experienced lawyers are nervous before their arguments. Nervousness
melts away quickly, however, once the argument begins. Prior to argu-
ment, it is helpful to think positively and gratefully about the experience:
you are appearing before nine people who want you to do a good job, and
if you are determined to do so, you certainly will. Remember, too, that
thorough preparation is the best cure for buck fever. Once you have mas-
tered your case, you will know it far better than the Justices and will be
able to guide them to a correct understanding of it.
In the end, it may be the case that no list of abstract suggestions can
provide much help to attorneys preparing for a first argument in the
Supreme Court. Perhaps it is impossible to improve on the straightfor-
ward advice of Judge Robert Bork: "Stand up straight; speak clearly; and
try to sound intelligent."25 If further embroidery is necessary, I would
only reiterate the suggestion that counsel experience firsthand the atmos-
phere of the courtroom prior to oral argument-an atmosphere in which
severe time constraints and rough-and-tumble questioning are the order of
the day.
25. Remarks of Hon. Robert H. Bork, Conference on Supreme Court Advocacy (Oct.
18, 1983).
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